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I. INTRODUCTION
The Warren Court is widely believed to have brought about a revolutionary
expansion of Fourth Amendment protections against government searches and
seizures.1 As examples of that expansion, State and local officers must adhere to
Fourth Amendment requirements or risk having the resulting evidence excluded
from the prosecution’s case in chief.2 A “search” no longer requires a physical
intrusion by law enforcement officers.3 Brief investigative stops and regulatory
inspections are subject to Fourth Amendment-based rules.4
It is also widely believed, however, that the Warren Court’s Fourth
Amendment revolution fizzled.5 It seems extreme to label the project a complete
failure, as major cases such as the ones just cited have never been overruled.
Indeed, rather than overruling Warren Court precedent, the Burger, Rehnquist, and
Roberts Courts have applied restrictive interpretations of Warren Court doctrine,
twisting the words and concepts to support conclusions quite different than—
indeed sometimes opposite to—their original thrust.6
Examining the dynamics of this counter-revolution, some commentators have
focused on the Court’s use of the easily manipulated Katz standard for determining
1. E.g., Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s Role in
the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 1361, 1363–64 n.14 (2004) (citing authority). Jack
Wade Nowlin, The Warren Court’s House Built on Sand: From Security in Persons, Houses, Papers, and Effects
to Mere Reasonableness in Fourth Amendment Doctrine, 81 MISS. L.J. 1017, 1018 (2012); Christopher Slobogin,
Distinguished Lecture Surveillance and the Constitution, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1105, 1111 (2009); cf. Aya Gruber,
Garbage Pails and Puppy Dog Tails: Is That What Katz is Made Of, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 781, 783 (2008) (and
sources cited at n.6) (focusing on the revolutionary aspects of Katz v. United States).
This article will use the term “government” to apply to State and local actors as well as to federal actors.
2. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
3. E.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
4. E.g., Terry v Ohio 392 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1968) (regarding stop and frisk); Camara v. Municipal Court of
the City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (regarding housing inspection). But see Lain, supra
note 1, at 1369 (contending Terry “was a complete capitulation to law enforcement interests”).
5. E.g., Nowlin, supra note 1, at 1018.
6. Accord, Gruber, supra note 1. Gruber focuses on “portions of the [Katz] decision that planted the seeds
of future jurisprudence subverting privacy.” Id. at 784–85; see also, e.g., Yale Kamisar, the Warren Court and
Criminal Justice: A Quarter-century Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1, 30 (1995) (applying the characterization of
Burger Court’s approach to Fourth Amendment law as a “‘bloody campaign of guerilla warfare,’” quoting Albert
W. Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 200 HARV. L. REV. 1436, 1442 (1987)).
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when official activity is a “search.”7 Part II of this Article will contribute to this
discussion. The subversion of the Warren Court revolution, however, goes beyond
the definition of “search.” It includes use of Warren Court rhetoric to justify
expansion of Reasonableness Clause8 doctrines that validate warrantless searches;
Part III will examine this dynamic, focusing on administrative and other “special
needs” searches. Subsequent Courts have also manipulated Warren Court rhetoric
to allow prosecutorial use of evidence obtained in outright violation of the Fourth
Amendment, and Part IV will trace this development.
II. IS THE OFFICIAL INTRUSION A “SEARCH”?
The definition of “search” is important. If a government activity is not a
“search” or a “seizure,” by its very words the Fourth Amendment does not apply.
If the Fourth Amendment does not apply, there will be no judicial oversight of the
government activity in question absent an applicable alternative provision of the
United States Constitution, a state constitution, or a statute. In Katz v. United
States,9 the Warren Court changed the definition of “search” to expand the scope
of Fourth Amendment coverage; Part A will trace this history. Part B will focus on
two of the ways subsequent Courts have twisted the Katz rhetoric.
A. What Was “Revolutionary” About Katz v. United States?
1. “Search” Jurisprudence Prior to Katz
According to the text, the Fourth Amendment covers searches and seizures of
“persons, houses, papers, and effects.”10 The pre-Warren Court’s adherence to the
text, however, was spotty, in part due to the influence of common law property
notions.11 For example, seizure of an effect was not protected by the Fourth
Amendment if the effect was stolen, contraband, or forfeit to the government.12 On
the other hand, effects in which the accused had the greater property interest were
immune from seizure under the “mere evidence rule” even if they were evidence,
7. E.g., id. at 790–91 (labeling this dynamic as a “manipulation problem”). Regarding the standard, see
infra, Part II.A.2.
8. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . ..” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9. Katz, 389 U.S. 954.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
11. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886); accord, e.g., Nowlin, supra note 1, at 1031–32
(2012) (describing early Courts as using a “protected interest” approach that focused on the text and on common
law property principles).
12. E.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (upholding a search and seizure of contraband
liquor); Boyd, 116 U.S. 616 (holding order to produce invoices evidencing a crime was a search or seizure subject
to the 4th and 5th Amendments). Entrance into the area containing the effect was still governed by Fourth
Amendment rules, however. See, Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) (decided same day as Gouled and
reversing conviction on grounds that entrance into home to seize contraband whiskey was unconstitutional).
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instrumentalities, or fruits of crime.13 As the Court concluded in 1886,
[t]he search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods
liable to duties and concealed to avoid the payment thereof [differs
from] a search for and seizure of a man’s private books and papers
[because i]n the one case, the government is entitled to the
possession of the property; in the other it is not.14
Property interests also explained the Court’s approach to the protection
afforded to private conversations. Although one’s words are arguably part of one’s
“person,” overhearing a private conversation was a “search” if officers trespassed
into the building in which the words were spoken, but not if there was no
unconsented physical intrusion.15 And property interests explained why
“curtilage,”16 apartments,17 hotel rooms,18 and non-public indoor commercial
spaces, such as offices19 merited Fourth Amendment protection notwithstanding
13. Based in the notion of superior property interests, the rule prohibited officials from searching for or
seizing items in which the accused had a greater property interest. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309–
11 (1921) (articulating the “mere evidence rule”); Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300 (1967)
(rejecting the rule).
14. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 622. The Boyd Court tied this distinction to the English statutory and common law
in effect when the Fourth Amendment was adopted as well as to a statute passed by the Congress that proposed
adoption of the amendment. Id. at 622.
15. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135–36 (1942) (denying coverage where officers overheard
oral communications without physical entrance into the office where they were made); Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438 (1928) (denying coverage where small wires were inserted into phone wires outside a residence and
in common spaces of a large office building). This focus on physical intrusion was based on traditional property
law. See generally, e.g., Dressler, Joshua & Alan C. Michaels, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, VOL. 1:
Investigation 68-70 (6th ed. 2013); Life and Times of Boyd v. United States (1886–-1976), 76 MICH. L. REV. 184
(1977).
16. Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932) (search of garage adjacent to residence and seizure of effects;
Ct. does not use word “curtilage,” but the two buildings were on the same city lot); Amos v. United States, 255
U.S. 313, 315 (1921) (search of home and store in the curtilage, and noting use of “curtilage” by petitioner); see,
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (noting that review of precedent shows no Fourth
Amendment violation unless officials physically invaded, inter alia, the curtilage). “Curtilage” is “the land
immediately surrounding and associated with the home.” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (citing
4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *225). See also, e.g., Bender, Eric Dean, Note: The Fourth Amendment in the
Age of Aerial Surveillance: Curtains for the Curtilage?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 725, 726 n.9 (quoting 2 Oxford
English Dictionary 1278 (1893) defining “curtilage” as “[a] small court, yard, garth, or piece of ground attached
to a dwelling-house, and forming one enclosure with it, or so regarded by the law; the area attached to and
containing a dwelling-house and its out-buildings.”‘).
17. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (search of apartment).
18. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (regarding hotel room that was defendant’s “living quarters”). Accord, Hoffa
v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1961).
19. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S.
344 (1931); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. U.S., 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
See also, Hoffa v. United states, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966) (assuming that the Fourth Amendment protects offices);
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134–36 (1942) (basing holding that Fourth Amendment did not apply
on lack of trespass as opposed to place being an office); Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438 (focusing on the lack of trespass
as opposed to one target being an office); Nowlin, supra note 1, at 1033–34 (discussing this use of the term
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the textual limits.20 On the other hand, reverting to a textual focus, the Court did
not allow property interests to result in Fourth Amendment protection for “open
fields,” which are privately owned outdoor areas other than curtilage.21
At first, the Warren Court continued the approach to Fourth Amendment
coverage taken by earlier Courts. The Court labeled a government activity a
“search” if it involved physical intrusion into a person’s body or clothing22; into a
house, apartment, or hotel room23; into non-public office or other commercial
space24; or into an automobile.25 As for conversations, the early Warren Court
confirmed that if surreptitious monitoring occurred while the parties were in a
public place, the Fourth Amendment did not apply.26 And, the Court clarified that
even if the conversation took place in a private space, consent to enter that space
“houses” as an example of what he calls the “liberal” version of the traditional approach).
20. Some of these early cases involved intrusions into areas that would not give rise to successful Fourth
Amendment challenges in later years. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948) (rooming house where
defendant had rented a room—agents were in common spaces, not ∆’s room); Trupiano v. United States, 334
U.S. 699, 701 (1948) (barn-like building that was close to a house that did not belong to the defendant).
21. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (concluding “[T]he special protection accorded by the
Fourth Amendment to the people in their ‘persons, houses, papers and effects,’ is not extended to the open fields.
The distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the common law”). See, e.g., Nowlin, supra note 1,
at 1032–33 (discussing Hester as an application of the traditional “protected interests” approach and of the “strict”
traditional approach that limited interests to dimensions established by common law property rights).
22. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Abel v.
United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
23. Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (decided in
term prior to Katz) (intrusion into house; overruling Frank v. Md., 359 U.S. 360 (1959), which upheld a state
court conviction of a homeowner who refused to permit inspection by a municipal health inspector); Lewis v.
United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) (intrusion into house); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965)
(intrusion into house); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (intrusion into house); Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505 (1961) (“spike mike” listening device that physically penetrated the wall into row house); Abel v. United
States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (intrusion into hotel room); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (intrusion
into house); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958) (intrusion into house); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S.
48 (1951) (intrusion into hotel room). Cf. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (holding search of home
would have been covered by Fourth Amendment if done by a federal officer); Chapman v. United States, 365
U.S. 610 (1961) (holding search of home by state officer that would have violated fourth amendment not
admissible in federal court).
24. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967) (locked commercial warehouse, labeling the intrusion
an “inspection” covered by the Fourth Amendment). Continuing the practice of previous Courts, the Warren
Court declined to give the “search” label to intrusions into commercial spaces open to the public generally. United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (seizure of effects and search of office open to the public).
25. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960) (intrusion
into taxi cab by city police); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959). The pre-Warren Court had interpreted
“effects” to include automobiles. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (seizure of person, search of
automobile, seizure of effects); United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581 (1948) (seizure of person and papers in auto);
Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931) (search of auto and seizure of effects); Segurola v. United States,
275 U.S. 106 (1927) (seizure of effects from car); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (seizure of effects
from a car).
26. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 749 (1952) (noting that one of the conversations with a wired
informant took place on public sidewalks). The conversation that took place in On Lee’s laundry may also have
been in an area open to the public. Id. at 749 (noting that the informant engaged in the conversation “while
customers came and went” but not specifying whether the informant was in the public or private areas of the
laundry).

793

2020 / Twists in the Use of Warren Court Fourth Amendment Rhetoric
was all the Fourth Amendment required; monitoring the conversation was not a
“search” even if the monitoring itself was not consensual.27
In validating use of conversation evidence, however, the Warren Court also
relied on a new line of reasoning: that the aggrieved party had assumed the risk
that the other person in the conversation would reveal its content.28 As we will see,
this “assumption of risk” reasoning would be the basis for undermining traditional
Fourth Amendment protections in the future.29
2. The 1967 Watershed: Hayden and Katz
In the 1966 Term, the Warren Court did away with the “mere evidence rule,”
which was central to the property-based analysis the Court had used for close to
one hundred years.30 In Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, the Court said,
“[T]he premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search
and seize has been discredited.”31 Instead, the Court focused on the Fourth
Amendment’s role in protecting individual privacy.32
Hayden was a mixed blessing for proponents of a robust Fourth Amendment.
On one hand, it eliminated Fourth Amendment rights by allowing officers to search
for and seize papers and effects in which the possessor had a superior property
interest; that trend, however, had already begun.33 On the other hand, Hayden’s
rejection of a property-based approach in favor of a focus on privacy opened the
door to a potential expansion of Fourth Amendment protections.

27. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 326 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438 (1963)
(regarding conversation in private office with obvious federal agent who was not obviously wired); see also On
Lee, 343 U.S. at 751-52 (using consent rationale where unclear whether conversation took place in a private
space). But see id. at 766 (Burton, J., dissenting) (arguing that the agent listening in to the monitored conversation
had essentially entered private space without consent).
The Warren Court had earlier relied on this reasoning in a statutory case in which officers had, with the consent
of one party, listened to a phone conversation on an extension phone. Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107,
111 (1957) (noting that “[e]ach party to a telephone conversation takes the risk that the other party may have an
extension telephone and may allow another to overhear the conversation”).
28. Lopez, 373 U.S. at 439 (regarding a wired informant). After this, the Warren Court relied on the same
“assumption of risk” reasoning in the context of an informant who merely remembered the conversation at issue
without use of electronic aids. Hoffa v. United States, 395 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (regarding conversations
conducted in Hoffa’s hotel room); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966). The Court noted that the
informant had consent to be in the hotel room and to hear the conversations at issue. Hoffa, 395 U.S. at 302. The
Court observed that Hoffa “was relying upon his misplaced confidence that Partin would not reveal his
wrongdoing.” Id. (citing Lopez).
29. See Part II.B.1.
30. Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301–02 (1967). Although the rule was established
in 1921, it was based on the property analysis established in 1886. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 30809 (1921). See discussion at supra, note 13.
31. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 at 304.
32. Id. at 301–02, and 304–05.
33. Id. at 306–07 (asserting that “[t]he requirement that the Government assert . . . some property interest
in material it seizes has long been a fiction, obscuring the reality that government has an interest in solving
crime”).
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The Court consolidated this new approach in its next term. United States v.
Katz involved electronic monitoring that picked up only the defendant’s side of a
phone call made from a public telephone booth.34 Focusing on a privacy rationale,
the Court held that overhearing the conversation was a Fourth Amendment
“search.”35 Neither the conversation nor the phone booth were Katz’s person,
house, paper, or effect; while the Court did mention that Katz paid to use the phone
and the booth, it did not base its holding on the notion that the booth was the
equivalent to a hotel room or on any other notion of a “protected interest.”36
Furthermore, there was no physical penetration into the booth, 37 and the Court
rejected reliance on physical entry38 and on a trespass-based analysis altogether.39
Instead, in finding the monitoring to violate the Fourth Amendment, the Court
announced a standard that has come to be known by its summary in Justice
Harlan’s concurrence: a government activity is a “search” when it violates a
person’s “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”40
In the course of creating this new test and applying it to the eavesdropping in
the case, the Katz Court used additional rhetoric. The Court distinguished the
situation here, where Katz had sought the privacy of the enclosed phone booth,
from a situation in which the defendant had not taken such precautions:
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected.41
As we will see, the Court’s use of this “assumption of risk” rationale42 would later

34. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
35. Id. at 351–53.
36. Id. at 352. But see Nowlin, supra note 1, at 1034 (suggesting the Katz Court could have analyzed the
issues using the “protected interests” approach for “houses”).
37. Id. at 348 (noting that the agents placed the listening device on the outside of the phone booth).
38. Id. at 353 (“The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate
the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance.”).
39. Id. (“We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our
subsequent decisions that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling”). But
see Jones v. United States, 565 U.S. 400, 406-07 (2012) (asserting Katz did not repudiate the concern for
government trespass); id. at 409 (asserting “the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to,
not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test) (emphasis in original).
40. See id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis provided); accord, Dressler & Michaels, supra note
15, at 71–73 (noting that the majority opinion in Katz did not clearly define “search” but that the concurring
opinion “filled the void”).
41. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (citations omitted).
42. The Katz majority did not use the word “risk,” but it cited cases that encompassed that concept. Id.
(citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966)) (regarding an undercover officer’s observations) and United
States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927) (regarding observations of items in plain view on the deck of a ship)). Justice
White, concurring, did use the term in referencing the earlier cases dealing with overheard conversations. Id. at
363 n.**.
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be used by post-Warren Courts in applying the Katz test.
Many believe that the Warren Court adopted the Katz test to expand the reach
of Fourth Amendment protections.43 Still, by the time the Warren Court ended in
June, 1969, the Katz test had made a bottom-line difference in only one case, to
support respondent’s standing to challenge a warrantless search and seizure.44
B. Twists in the Notion of “Reasonable Expectations of Privacy”
Post-Warren Courts pulled back on Katz’s promise of a more expansive notion
of what constitutes a “search.”45 This Part will address two ways the Court has
accomplished this retrenchment within the confines of the “reasonable expectation
of privacy” standard. First, in analyzing what expectations of privacy are
reasonable, the Court often eschews consideration of what ordinary people
realistically expect in normal daily life. Instead, the Court describes abnormal or
even socially unacceptable or deviant behavior that people might engage in and
concludes that law enforcement officers should be able to do the same without
judicial oversight.46 As a second approach, the Court sometimes uses what
amounts to a “superior property interest” analysis refashioned in “reasonable
expectation of privacy” terms.
1. No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Regarding Observations that
Private Persons “Could” Make
The post-Warren Court combined “assumption of risk” language with the Katz
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test to deny the “search” label to government

43. E.g., Gruber, supra note 1, at 783; Nowlin, supra note 1, at 1038 (stating “[t]he obvious reason behind
the reframing in Katz was to expand the reach of the Fourth Amendment beyond its enumerated interests”). But
see Lain, supra note 1, at 1369 (arguing Katz was a “concession to law enforcement interests on the issue of
wiretapping”).
44. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968). Katz did not affect the bottom line on other late Warren
Court cases. In some, the “search” label could have been applied under the pre-Katz approach, and the focal issue
was whether the searches were properly conducted. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search of
house); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (search of person). See also, Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165,
171-72 (1969) (assuming that the surveillance involved a “search” under both pre-Katz and Katz holdings and
remanding the cases for factual findings regarding standing). In one case, the Court decided that the new test
announced in Katz would not be applied retroactively. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
45. In addition to the applications to be discussed, the Burger Court also used the “expectation of privacy”
test to curtail the scope of defendants’ “standing” to raise a 4th Amendment challenge to evidence. Compare,
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 264-64 (1960) with United States v Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980)
(overruling Jones); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
46. Accord, e.g., George M. Dery III & James R. Fox, Chipping Away at the Boundaries of Privacy: Intel’s
Pentium III Processor Serial Number and the Erosion of Fourth Amendment Privacy Expectations, 17 Geo. State
Univ. L. Rev. 331, 345–-46 (2000); Gruber, supra note 1, at 791 and 795 (dividing this dynamic into
“manipulation” and “normativity” aspects); Susan F. Mandiberg, Reasonable Officers vs. Reasonable Lay
Persons in the Supreme Court’s Miranda and Fourth Amendment Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1481 (2010)
and articles cited therein.

796

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 51
examinations that easily could have been “searches” under pre-Katz doctrine.47
The Burger Court began the trend when it used the “assumption of risk” rationale
to undercut normal social expectations for anyone who wants to take advantage of
the conveniences of modern life. Use of checking accounts and credit cards is one
such area, and banks maintain the records that, in an earlier era, individuals might
keep in their homes or offices. Ordinary people might expect that the cancelled
checks and other information kept in bank records would be safe from warrantless
government inspection. On the contrary, however, United States v. Miller held that
the there is no “legitimate ‘expectation of privacy’” in the contents of checks,
financial statements, and deposit slips because they “contain only information
voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary
course of business.”48 That being so, “[t]he depositor takes the risk, in revealing
his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the
Government.”49 As the government activity is not a “search,” the Fourth
Amendment does not require judicial oversight through a warrant or otherwise.
This rationale came to be known as the “third-party doctrine.”50
In Smith v. Maryland, the Burger Court went on to use the third-party doctrine
to conclude that officers did not conduct a “search” when they obtained records of
the numbers dialed from defendant’s phone. The Court concluded that the
defendant lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the information because a
person voluntarily turns the information over to the phone company.51 Thus, Smith
“assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he
dialed.”52
The rationale in these “third-party doctrine” cases—voluntary conveyance of
information and assumption of risk that a third party would use it—put the onus
on citizens to opt out of modern life if they want to retain privacy. One can prevent
government knowledge of one’s financial information by choosing to use cash and
a cookie jar instead of bank accounts, checks, and credit cards. One can prevent
the government from easily tracking the identity and frequency of communication
contacts by meeting face-to-face instead of using the telephone. Failure to take
47. Accord, Nowlin, supra note 1, at 1038 (asserting that the “Katzian ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’
approach . . . in fact has threatened to undermine the Fourth Amendment’s traditional protections”), id. at 1039–
41 (noting that the Katz test has narrowed the reach of the Amendment by reducing the importance of common
law principles).
48. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). Defendant objected to ATF agents obtaining his
records from banks, arguing “that he has a Fourth Amendment interest in the records kept by the banks because
they are merely copies of personal records that were made available to the banks for a limited purpose and in
which he has a reasonable expectation of privacy.”
49. Id. at 443 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. at 751–52; the Court also cited the pre-Katz cases
Hoffa and Lopez). The Court of Appeals found that the subpoenas did not “constitute adequate ‘legal process’
and suppressed the evidence. Id. at 439.
50. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018); Kerr, Orin S., The Case for the
Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561 (2009).
51. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739–44 (1979). The Fourth Amendment was at issue because police
had requested the phone company to install a “pen register” to capture the dialed numbers. Id. at 739 n.4.
52. Id. at 744.
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these extreme measures, however, is tantamount to assuming the risk of
government surveillance and therefore “voluntarily” agreeing to it.53
Furthermore, without citing the “third-party doctrine” cases or using their
precise language, the Burger Court extended this privacy-destroying rationale to
another activity essential to modern life: driving a car. In Texas v. Brown, the
defendant’s car was validly halted at a “routine driver’s license checkpoint”; with
the driver still inside, officers shined a light and peered into the interior of the car.
The Burger Court concluded that this behavior did not constitute a Fourth
Amendment “search.”54 This was so because the driver had no “legitimate
expectation of privacy” in the car’s interior, as “inquisitive passersby” could also
view that area from outside the vehicle.55 It is debatable whether member of the
general public could bend down, use a flashlight, and look into a car that was, for
example, stopped at a traffic light, and it is even more debatable whether a member
of the general public would even do so. In the Court’s view, however, this
abnormal example of possible behavior becomes the norm for judging whether the
officer violated a reasonable expectation of privacy.
The following discussion will review how the Rehnquist Court continued to
combine an abnormal view of behavior with the “assumption of risk” rationale and
apply the combination to a broader swath of everyday life. One line of cases
involved observations of activity in the curtilage; in these cases, while ostensibly
applying the Katz standard, the Court came to the same conclusions it might have
adopted under the old property-based analysis. On the other hand, in a case
involving trash left at the curb for collection, the Court used an arguably abnormal
interpretation of the Katz test and thereby got around limits that the property-based
approach might have imposed.
a. Aerial Observations of Curtilage
The Court’s adoption of an abnormal behavior approach to the “search”
standard emerges clearly in its cases regarding aerial searches of curtilage. Houses
have traditionally occupied a special place in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,56

53. Accord, e.g., William C. Heffernan, Fourth Amendment Privacy Interests, 92 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 6 (2001) (labeling the Court’s approach as a “vigilance model of privacy”); cf, e.g., Gruber,
supra note 1, at 791 (noting that Katz itself “hinges privacy on an individual’s cautionary behavior”) and at 804–
05 (developing this theme). See also, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 6, at 35 (challenging the Court’s notion that the
assumption of risk involved in the third-party doctrine cases is “voluntary”).
54. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983).
55. Id. at 740.
56. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1984) (asserting that society recognizes as
justifiable the expectation that private residences are free of governmental intrusion and that warrantless searches
and seizures inside a home are presumptively unreasonable absent exigencies); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 589-90 (1980) (noting that the “zone of privacy” is most clearly defined by “the physical dimensions of an
individual’s home” and that the right to be free of unreasonable governmental intrusion into the home is at the
core of the Fourth Amendment); Hester v. United States, 265 US 57, 59 (1924). Stephanie M. Godfrey & Kay
Levine, Much Ado About Randolph: The Supreme Court Revisits, 42 Tulsa L. Rev. 731, 732 (2007); Thomas Y.
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and the curtilage has been treated as an integral part of the house.57 Nevertheless,
the Rehnquist Court58 concluded that people who effectively use high walls to
screen their yards from observation by normal passersby knowingly expose those
yards to government observation from fixed-wing planes flying at 1000 feet or
from helicopters hovering at 400 feet over the yard.59 As these flights are not
illegal,60 “any member of the public” could rent a plane or helicopter and do the
same thing.61 The Court concluded “that respondent’s expectation that his garden
was protected from such observation is unreasonable and is not an expectation that
society is prepared to honor.”62 Thus, it is not a “search” for government officials
to undertake these activities.
The Court’s application of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard
reflects an abnormal view of expectable human behavior. Common sense suggests
that it is not “reasonable” to expect people to put a covering over their yards to
prevent aerial snooping. In addition while it is technically possible that someone
with an interest in another’s activities would use planes or helicopters to peer into
a walled yard, common sense would tell us that this would be unusual, not to say
aberrant behavior. It is likely that such behavior by a private individual, once
discovered, would be strongly disapproved as a violation of acceptable social
norms.63 By not acknowledging that mainly government agents would want to take
Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 547, 642 (1999).
57. See supra note 16.
58. The Burger Court opened the door to this line of reasoning by applying Katz’s “knowingly expose”
language to conclude that when police observed a woman’s behavior as she stood in the doorway of her house
she was in a public place. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 40, 42 (1976). Although the doorway of her
house was part of the curtilage (if not the house itself), she had no reasonable expectation of privacy because
“[s]he was not merely visible to the public but was as exposed to public view, speech, hearing, and touch as if she
had been standing completely outside her house. Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351). Id. at 212–13 (concluding
that the area observed was curtilage). It is common for passersby to observe people on their front porches or
yards, and as Santana took no steps to shield herself from the view of passersby, the reasoning is hard to refute.
59. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989) (plurality) (regarding a helicopter flying at 440 feet over
the curtilage and viewing the inside of a greenhouse through holes in the roof); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207, 209 (1986) (regarding warrantless observation, from a fixed-wing plane at 1000 feet, of a backyard that was
completely enclosed by a six-foot outer fence and a 10-foot inner fence).
60. The Ciraolo opinion was at pains to point out that the plane was “within navigable air space.” Ciraolo,
476 U.S. at 209. Similarly, the Riley plurality mentioned that helicopter flights in public airways are routine in
the United States and are not “unheard of” in the county at issue; that it was not “contrary to law or regulation”
for a helicopter to fly below the allowed altitude for fixed-wing aircraft; and (putting the burden on the accused)
that there was no evidence that the helicopter interfered with Riley’s use of his greenhouse or curtilage. Riley,
488 U.S. at 450–52.
61. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, at 451 (1989) (plurality); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, at 213–
14 (1986). Interestingly, in a case decided the same day as Ciraolo but not involving domestic curtilage, the Court
and Government conceded that “surveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance
equipment not generally available to the public . . . might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant.” Dow
Chemical v United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986) (using satellite technology as an example). The Dow
Chemical Court, however, did not think a sophisticated aerial mapping camera qualified because it could not
penetrate walls or windows or hear conversations. Id. at 239.
62. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 214.
63. See, e.g., Steven Dale, “Not Over My Back Yard,” The Gondola Project, Nov. 15, 2009, available at
http://gondolaproject.com/2009/11/15/not-over-my-back-yard/ (regarding neighborhood outrage at proposed
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such steps—and by declining to consider seriously the problems posed by use of
sophisticated technology to see what could not be viewed without a physical
trespass—the Court was out of touch with the Katz promise.
Of course, the aerial observations would probably not have been “searches”
under the pre-Katz property approach as there was no physical trespass into the
curtilage.64 However, Hayden and Katz had seemed to replace the physical trespass
approach in favor of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard.65 Without
rejecting that standard, the post-Warren Court reinstated the previous bottom line.
b. Rummaging Through Trash
In California v. Greenwood, the Court held that it is not a Fourth Amendment
“search” for officers to rummage through garbage placed in closed containers at
the curb for pick-up.66 The curb was outside the curtilage, but the Court did not
conclude that it had been abandoned.67 Thus, the garbage was still Greenwood’s
property, and people often take their effects into public. If the Court had focused
its “reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis on socially approved behavior of
neighbors and passersby, it arguably would have found the rummaging to be a
“search.” As Justice Gorsuch later observed,
I doubt . . . that most people spotting a neighbor rummaging
through their garbage would think they lacked reasonable grounds
to confront the rummager. Making the decision all the stranger,
California state law expressly protected a homeowner’s property
rights in discarded trash. . . . Yet rather than defer to that as
evidence of the people’s habits and reasonable expectations of
privacy, the Court [in Greenwood] substituted its own curious
aerial tram route over houses and backyards). Faced with a fait accompli, residents remain resentful. See, e.g.,
Randy rag and Aaron Scott, “From Controversy to Icon: Portland’s Aerial Tram Turns 10,” Oregon Public
Broadcasting, Feb. 13, 2017, available at https://www.opb.org/radio/programs/state-of-wonder/article/portlandaerial-tram-ohsu-10-year-anniversary/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). Objections exist
even though the tram moves quickly and does not hover; as a frequent rider, I can attest that it would be difficult
to make detailed observations of backyard activities.
64. See supra at notes 22–25.
65. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967); accord,
e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 748–49 (1971)
(plurality); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 365, 368 (1969). But see Jones v. United States, 565 U.S. 400, 406-07
(2012); (asserting Katz did not repudiate the concern for government trespass); id. at 409 (asserting “the Katz
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test)
(emphasis in original).
66. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988).
67. Cf. Gruber, supra note 1 (noting that the Court’s apparent concession that Greenwood might have
retained a subjective expectation of privacy in his trash). Note that finding abandonment might have been a
stretch. In the closest Supreme Court precedent at that time, the Court found that a guest had abandoned trash left
in his hotel-room wastepaper basket after he had checked out. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960).
On the other hand, the Court previously found that a person had abandoned a jar containing contraband whiskey
by dropping the jar on the ground. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924).
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judgment.68
One aspect of the Greenwood Court’s “curious judgment” was the notion that
Greenwood had “voluntarily”69 given his effects to the trash collector, who
acceded to official requests to hand the effects over to police.70 The Court did not
use the term “assumption of risk,” but it used the elements of that approach: first,
that “the trash collector . . . might himself have sorted through respondents’ trash
or permitted others, such as the police, to do so”71; and second, that “respondents
exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat their claim” of a
reasonable expectation of privacy.72 This conclusion was based on the Court’s
sense of what people could do, which was in turn based on abnormal or socially
disapproved behavior:
[i]t is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at
the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals,
children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public. . ..
Accordingly, having deposited their garbage ‘in an area
particularly suited for public inspection and, in a manner of
speaking, public consumption, for the express purpose of having
strangers take it’ . . . respondents could have had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the inculpatory items that they
discarded.73
While the Court buttressed its assertion with one example each of trash being
disturbed by “animals . . . scavengers, [and] snoops,”74 its analysis “employ[ed]
the worst case scenario as its standard.”75
Greenwood was decided in 1988, and the rise of homelessness had already
increased the incidence of people going through garbage left at the curb; people
were generally unhappy with the situation, although some found ways to
accommodate the problem.76
68. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2266 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting, objecting to the
“often unpredictable—and sometimes unbelievable—jurisprudence” engendered by the Katz standard) (citation
omitted).
69. See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 41 (analogizing the placement of garbage at the curb to “voluntarily”
exposing dialed phone numbers and backyard activities). Greenwood was required by local ordinance to place his
trash on the curb for pickup. Id. at 54–55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 37.
71. Id. at 40–41.
72. Id. at 40.
73. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988) (quoting United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d
397, 399 (3d Cir. 1981).
74. Id. at 40 (also listing “children” without an example).
75. Accord, e.g., Dery, supra note 46, at 345–46; Gruber, supra note 1, at 799.
76. See, e.g., Allan R. Gold, Seeking the Middle Ground With the Homeless on Trash, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
26 1990, at B.1. Thirty years later, people are still complaining about the problem of others going through their
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****
The premise behind the Court’s reasoning in these “assumption of risk”
decisions is disturbing. Essentially, if ordinary, everyday people could undertake
the examination at issue, even if their doing do is unlikely or disapproved,
government agents should be able to do the same thing without judicial Fourth
Amendment oversight.77 It may be worth noting that the Court takes a different
approach once it has determined by official activity is, in fact, a “search.” In
determining whether an acknowledged “search” is reasonable without a warrant,
the Court sometimes declines to accept deviant or socially unacceptable behavior
as the Fourth Amendment standard.78 The contrast in approaches is striking: if the
question is the reasonableness of a “search,” judicial oversight for Fourth
Amendment adherence is guaranteed (either at the warrant stage or through a postsearch suppression motion). There is no judicial oversight once the Court decides
that the activity is not a “search’ at all, and so the Court’s “assumption of risk”
analysis leaves the Fourth Amendment out of the picture.
2. No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Some Contraband Investigations
The Court has always interpreted the Fourth Amendment to allow officers to
seize contraband such as illegal drugs. Under the pre-Katz approach, the
government’s power to seize the drugs was based on its superior property
interest.79 Even then, however, officers needed a warrant or an alternative Fourth
Amendment doctrine to enter the place where the drugs were kept.80 Yet
notwithstanding disavowal of the property-based approach in Hayden and Katz,81
the post-Warren Court has relied on the government’s interest in contraband to
conclude that there may be no “reasonable expectation of privacy” in a closed
trash. See, e.g., “Keeping hobos out of your trash?” (Question and Answer discussion on Yelp), available at
https://www.yelp.com/topic/las-vegas-keeping-hobos-out-of-your-trash (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review); “Someone is digging through my trash and recycling. . .is this legal?” (Thread on reddit),
available
at
https://www.reddit.com/r/legaladvice/comments/68tkdh/ma_someone_is_digging_through_my_trash_and/ (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
77. Accord, Heffernan, supra note 53, at 4–6 (describing the Court’s approach as exempting police from
everyday expectations of forbearance and requiring them to avoid only egregious violations of privacy norms).
78. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 113 (2006) (basing the requirement of a warrant to enter a home
on the conclusion that ordinary people would decline to enter if one co-tenant refused permission despite the other
co-tenant granting it). While the Court has said that one test of “legitimate” privacy expectations is
“understandings that are recognized and permitted by society,” its approach does not include at least some
behavior that is criminal. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).
79. See supra, Part II.A.2.
80. E.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (applying an “automobile exception” to the search
of a vehicle for contraband liquor); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) (reversing conviction due to
unconstitutional entry into home to seize contraband whisky).
81. See supra notes 10, 27, 28 & note 30 and accompanying text.
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container when the target of the search is unlawful drugs. That being the case,
intrusion into the container is not a “search,” and so no warrant or Reasonableness
Clause validation is necessary.
This line of reasoning began with the “drug dog” cases. These are cases in
which a trained dog sniffed the outside of a container and alerted if it sensed
narcotics inside. The Burger Court concluded that the canine sniff does not violate
the container owner’s reasonable expectation of privacy because it reveals only
contraband.82 The Rehnquist Court agreed.83
Toward the end of its run, the Burger Court extended this reasoning beyond
the drug dog context. United States v. Jacobsen involved agents properly taking
control of a package that Fed Ex employees had opened to reveal a suspicious
white powder.84 The agents’ field testing of the powder was an “additional
intrusion.”85 The Court noted, however, that this intrusion was not a “search,” as
“[a]chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a particular substance is
cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy.”86
3. Is the Official Intrusion a “Search”?
When is police activity a Fourth Amendment “search”? The Katz “reasonable
expectation of privacy” standard is still the main test, and the cases and doctrines
82. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (Noting the sniff does “not expose noncontraband
items that otherwise would remain hidden . . . Moreover, the sniff discloses only the presence of absence of
narcotics”) (emphasis supplied).
The rationale in Place does not extend to emanations that do not involve contraband. See Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27 (2001) (invalidating the warrantless use of a thermal-imaging device to confirm the use of heat lamps
in a suspected marijuana growing operation in a private home); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984)
(invalidating the warrantless use of an electronic tracking device to detect the existence of a non-contraband can
of ether inside a house); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 n.23 (1984) (distinguishing from drugs the
private possession of obscenity). In addition, the lack of Fourth Amendment protection applies only to the odor
itself: gaining access to the object to be investigated could involve a Fourth Amendment “search” or “seizure.
E.g., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (finding a Fourth Amendment violation in officer and dog making an
unconsented entry into the curtilage for the dog to sniff at the front door of the house); Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 120–
21 (noting that the agent’s “assertion and control over the package and its contents” was a “seizure,” but finding
the seizure reasonable); Place, 462 U.S. at 707-10 (declining on the facts to validate the seizure of luggage without
probable cause); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) (reversing conviction on grounds that entrance into
home to seize contraband whiskey was unconstitutional).
83. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005) (“Official conduct that does not ‘“compromise any
legitimate interest in privacy” is not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment. We have held that any interest in
possessing contraband cannot be deemed ‘“legitimate,” and thus governmental conduct that only reveals the
possession of contraband “compromises no legitimate privacy interest”); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531
U.S. 32, 40 (2000) (“The fact that officers walk a narcotics-detection dog around the exterior of each car. . . does
not transform the seizure into a search [because, as in Place] an exterior sniff of an automobile does not require
entry into the car and is not designed to disclose any information other than the presence or absence of narcotics”);
see also Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409 (rejecting challenge to premise that dog sniffs reveal only narcotics); cf.
Jardines, 466 U.S. at 10 (not disputing that the dog sniff itself is not a “search,” but focusing, in a property-based
analysis, on the officer’s entry into the curtilage with the dog).
84. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, at 121 (1984).
85. Id. at 122.
86. Id. at 123 (asserting that this conclusion was “dictated” by United States v. Place).
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reviewed in this Part are still good law. There are signs, however, that the extreme
intrusiveness possible with modern technology may be giving the Roberts Court
pause. The Court has resurrected the property-based approach to apply the
“search” label to official use of a GPS tracking device87 and has applied a propertyrelated rationale to label one use of drug-sniffing dogs as a “search.”88 Similarly,
but without reliance on the property rationale, the Court has partially retreated from
application of the third-party doctrine in cases involving a information stored on a
mobile-phone89 and cell-site location data.90 These pull-backs are few, however,
leaving a vast array of ordinary behavior and locations open to official
investigation without judicial oversight based on the Fourth Amendment.
III. WAS THE WARRANTLESS “SEARCH” NEVERTHELESS
“REASONABLE”?
Part II explored how post-Warren Courts used the “reasonable expectation of
privacy” standard to conclude that the Fourth Amendment did not apply. PostWarren Courts have also used the notion of “reasonable expectations of privacy”
to broaden government power to conduct what are admittedly “searches” without
a warrant and, at times, without individualized suspicion. The Court has done this
by using a balancing test to determine whether a warrantless intrusion is reasonable
and by putting a finger on the government side of the balance through the concept
of a “diminished” or “lesser” expectation of privacy.91 And, as before, Warren
Court decisions that seemed to expand Fourth Amendment protections set the stage
for use of Warren Court rhetoric to restrict Fourth Amendment rights.
A. The Expansion of Fourth Amendment Coverage in Camara and See
In 1967, the Warren Court treated as a “search” a type of intrusion to which
the Court had not previously applied the Fourth Amendment: administrative
inspections for violations of civil statutes and regulations. Camara v. Municipal
Court of the City and County of San Francisco applied the Fourth Amendment to
housing inspections for code violations sanctioned by civil fines92; See v. Seattle
applied the Fourth Amendment to civil inspections of non-public portions of
87. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–06 (2012).
88. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5–6 (2013).
89. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
90. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
91. There are, of course, other ways the Court has undermined “reasonableness” analysis to further lawenforcement interests. See, e.g., Nowlin, supra note 1, at 1050–51 (discussing use of reasonableness analysis in
police creation of exigent circumstances).
92. Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967)
(approving administrative searches with warrants based on “reasonable legislative or administrative standards
[that are] satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling.”). Camara overruled Frank v. State of Maryland, 359
U.S. 360 (1959), which had upheld conviction for refusing to allow a health inspector to make a warrantless
inspection of a home. Id. at 528.
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commercial premises.93
As it extended the concept of “search” to these inspections, the Warren Court
introduced two new concepts. First was the use of a balancing test to evaluate the
reasonableness of a warrantless search: “the need to search [balanced] against the
invasion which the search entails.”94 The second was the notion that it is sometimes
“reasonable” to eliminate traditional criminal probable cause and individualized
suspicion as pre-requisites to a valid “search.”95 These new concepts opened the
door to the additional restriction of Fourth Amendment protections.
B. Twists in the Use of Administrative Search Rhetoric
Although the Warren Court ended in 1969, Justice Douglas, a member of that
Court, extended the thrust of the Camara and See opinions when authoring
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States in 1970.96 Camara and See had relaxed
traditional requirements by approving administrative searches without criminal
probable cause or individualized suspicion, but the Court required inspectors to get
an administrative warrant.97 Colonnade Catering suggested that even the relaxed
administrative warrant was not required if there was a long history of regulation of
the industry at issue and an adequate statutory framework existed to define the
limits of the search.98 In United States v. Biswell the Court clarified that the
inspection must be central to the government’s enforcement efforts.99
A few years later, the Burger Court added a new wrinkle to the analysis by
folding in the “reasonable expectation of privacy” rhetoric: pervasive regulation
means that the business at issue has a diminished expectation of privacy.100
Bolstered by this new combination of ideas, the Court began to extend the concepts
of diminished privacy and close regulation beyond the administrative search
context.
93. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
94. Camara, 387 U.S. at 537.
95. Id. at 538–39; See, 397 U.S. at 545–46.
96. Colonnade Catering Corp. v United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76–77 (1970) (regarding inspection of a liquor
licensee for possible violation of excise tax law). In Colonnade Catering the search was unconstitutional,
however, because Congress had not authorized forcible warrantless entry. Id. at 77. It would be disingenuous to
credit the Burger Court with this case, as Chief Justice Burger authored the dissent, joined by Justices Black and
Stewart. Id. at 77. The Court referred to “the special treatment of inspection laws of this kind” as set out in Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Id.
97. Camara, 387 U.S. at 538–39; See, 387 U.S. at 545–46.
98. Colonnade Catering, 397 U.S. at 76–77.
99. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315–16 (1972) (involving inspection under the Gun Control
Act of 1968); see also, New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702, 708–10 (1987) (involving inspection under New
York vehicle dismantler statute); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602, 606 (1982) (involving inspection under
the Federal Mine Safety & Health Act of 1977).
100. Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315–16; see also, Burger, 482 U.S. at 703; Dewey, 452 U.S. at 605.
“Close” or “pervasive” regulation means refers to regulation specific to the type of industry, not the amount of
generally applicable regulation that applies. Burger, 482 U.S. at 703–06; Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S.
307, 313–14 (1978).
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1. A New Rationale for Auto Searches
In 1973, in Cady v. Dombrowski, the Court considered the warrantless search
of a car that had been impounded following an accident.101 No existing doctrine
was directly on point. The so-called “auto exception,” adopted in 1925, involved a
car that was mobile on the highway, which was not this car.102 The Warren Court’s
“inventory search” doctrine applied to searches conducted for the protection of the
police and the car’s operator, which was not this search.103
To validate this search, the Court adopted a new rationale. The Court relied on
the pervasive regulation of cars by the states and the sense that state and local
police often come in contact with cars for “community caretaking functions” as
opposed to crime.104
The constitutional difference between searches of and seizures
from houses and similar structures and from vehicles stems both
from the ambulatory character of the latter and from the fact that
extensive, and often noncriminal contact with automobiles will
bring local officials in ‘plain view’ of evidence, fruits, or
instrumentalities of a crime, or contraband.
Tellingly, the Court cited an administrative search case, United States v. Biswell,
as analogous.105
In 1974, a plurality in Cardwell v. Lewis further expanded the rationale for
searching cars, folding in the Warren Court’s “knowingly expose to public”
rhetoric106:

101. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (regarding a car that had been impounded following an
accident).
102. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (allowing the warrantless search of vehicles on the
highway if police had probable cause to search them, as the mobility of the vehicle made it easy for the driver to
leave the jurisdiction before a warrant could be obtained); accord, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 804–
09 (1982) (reviewing basis for Carroll and noting importance of probable cause); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364, 367 (1976).
103. The search in Dombrowski was to find evidence, that is, the defendant police officer’s service
revolver, and no inventory of the car was attempted. 413 U.S. at 436-37. Inventory searches are not searches for
evidence. See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (explaining that a police department regulation
required the impounding officer to remove all valuables from the car and attach a property tag to it); Cooper v.
State of California, 386 U.S. 58, 61–62 (1967) (concluding that where the car was potentially subject to forfeiture
and had to be kept for considerable time, the Court concluded that it was reasonable for police to search the car
for their own protection The Dombrowski Court noted the inventory search cases but did not rely on them. 413
U.S. at 442.
104. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 441.
105. Id. at 442 (citing United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); see supra note 100 and accompanying
text.
106. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (asserting “[w]at a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection”). See supra text
accompanying note 41.
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[a vehicle’s] function is transportation and it seldom serves as
one’s residence or as the repository of personal effects. A car has
little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public
thoroughfares where its occupants and its contents are in plain
view. . . . ‘What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.’ This is not to say that no part of the interior of an
automobile has Fourth Amendment protection; the exercise of a
desire to be mobile does not, of course, waive one’s right to be
free of unreasonable government intrusion. But insofar as Fourth
Amendment protection extends to a motor vehicle, it is the right
to privacy that is the touchstone of our inquiry.107
The Court thus came to combine a variety of rationales to cover searches of
both mobile and immobile vehicles. The Court used this multi-faceted approach to
reaffirm the reasonableness of inventory searches of the interior of lawfully
impounded vehicles,108 the warrantless search of the interior of some mobile
homes,109 and the suspicionless and warrantless search of the dashboard of an
automobile to observe the vehicle identification number.110 The “reduced
expectation of privacy” rationale for vehicle searches has also, indirectly, affected
the search of closed containers found inside a vehicle.111
2. Closely Regulated Persons
The Fourth Amendment specifically extends its protection to “persons.”112
Nevertheless, the Court has used the “close regulation” rationale to validate
warrantless searches of persons, without individualized suspicion, for evidence of

107. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590–91 (1974) (plurality) (citations omitted) (finding a reduced
expectation because the vehicle’s “function is transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence or as the
repository of personal effects” and because a car “travels public thoroughfares where its occupants and its contents
are in plain view”). The Court of Appeals had considered taking the paint scrapings to be a search (417 U.S. at
589), and the Court’s analysis proceeded on that basis. Id. at 591–92.
108. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367–68 (1976) (regarding inventory search of a car
impounded for parking violations). See also, Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (hinting that
warrantless searches of cars are valid, even without the exigency of mobility, based on the reduced expectation
of privacy that comes with the pervasive regulation of automobiles); see also California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386,
392 (1985) (“[t]he public is fully aware that it is accorded less privacy in its automobiles because of this
compelling governmental need for regulation”).
109. Carney, 471 U.S. at 388, 392 (treating the structure as an auto, as opposed to the “house,” when the
mobile home “is found stationary in a place not regularly used for residential purposes—temporary or otherwise”).
110. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112–19 (1986) (focusing on the physical characteristics of an
automobile and its pervasive regulation and noting that placement of papers obscuring the VIN was insufficient
to create a privacy interest).
111. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 574–76 (1991) (allowing officers who are validly searching
vehicles to open closed containers in the vehicle that could hold the item being sought).
112. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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use of alcohol or other drugs. This line of cases began when the Court approved
administering drug tests to persons in specific occupations in given circumstances.
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, for example, the circumstance was
involvement in “certain train accidents.”113 The Rehnquist Court concluded that
the government’s interest in breath, blood, and urine tests outbalanced what the
Court saw as a minimal intrusion on railroad employees:
[T]he expectations of privacy of covered employees are
diminished by reason of their participation in an industry that is
regulated pervasively to ensure safety, a goal dependent, in
substantial part, on the health and fitness of covered employees.114
Similarly, in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, the Court upheld
a program mandating that Customs Service employees undergo suspicionless drug
tests when they applied for promotion to positions involving interdiction of illegal
drugs that required them to carry firearms or handle classified materials.115
The fact of close regulation was evidently crucial to the holdings in these cases,
as the Court has declined to approve suspicionless drug tests for those in an
occupation not considered to be closely or pervasively regulated.116 Nevertheless,
there are evidently limits to the reach of that rationale. Although automobiles are
closely regulated117 and driving them can be dangerous, in 2013 the Court rebuffed
prosecutors’ attempt to apply the diminished expectation of privacy in vehicles to
the person driving the car, at least when a test more intrusive than collection of
urine was involved.118
The Court has, however, applied the “pervasively regulated” rationale outside
of the business context. Specifically analogizing “students who voluntarily
participate in school athletics” with “adults who choose to participate in a ‘closely
regulated industry,’” the Court approved the suspicionless, warrantless urine
113. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 606 (1989) (noting that the tests were
authorized by regulations under the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970).
114. Id. at 627 (balancing the government’s interest against a reduced expectation of privacy to find a
required blood test). See also id. at 620–24, 628–33 (evaluating the government’s interest); id. at 616–18, 624–
27 (concluding intrusions were minimal); id. at 619 (articulating the balancing approach); National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665–66 (1989) (decided the same day as Skinner and applying the
same approach).
115. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666 (1989). The Court noted that
the program was “not designed to serve the ordinary needs of law enforcement,” that the government had
“substantial interests” similar to those in Skinner, and that these outweighed the employees’ privacy interests. Id.
at 666, 668.
116. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 305 (1997) (regarding candidates for political office).
117. See supra notes 103–04.
118. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 159 (2013) (rejecting the suggestion that drivers be subject to
warrantless blood tests for blood alcohol level in favor of requiring a case-by-case determination of exigency
based on the probability of dissipation of the alcohol before a warrant could be obtained). The Court concluded
that the reduced privacy in vehicles does not carry over to piercing a motorist’s skin.
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testing of school children who participate in interschool athletics; citing Skinner
and Biswell, the Court concluded that both “have reason to expect intrusions upon
normal rights and privileges, including privacy.”119 The Court later applied this
holding to students engaged in a broad range of extra-curricular activities.120
3. The “Reasonableness” of Government “Special Needs”
Searches involving closely regulated businesses and persons are one example
of activities that involve a concept known as “special needs” searches, “not
designed to serve the ordinary needs of law enforcement.”121 The analysis folds
the “special need” into the government side of the balancing test.122 The
government’s “special need” is often seen as considerable, so when the other side
of the balance involves a “diminished” expectation of privacy—for example due
to pervasive regulation—the Court easily finds warrantless and even suspicionless
searches to be acceptable.
It is important to note that even though “special needs” do not include ordinary
law enforcement, an official conducting the “special needs” investigation can seize
evidence of crime in “plain view.”123 Thus, “special needs” searches can and do
lead to criminal prosecution and conviction.124
Protection of individual Fourth Amendment rights will inevitably lose in this
balance.
IV. ALLOWING UNREASONABLE WARRANTLESS “SEARCHES”
As the following discussion will trace, federal courts have excluded evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment since the late nineteenth century,
and the Warren Court extended this requirement to the states.125 Nevertheless, the
Warren Court also made an exception to allow prosecutors to use such evidence to
impeach the testimony of defendants who take the stand at their criminal trials.126
119. Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657, 664–65 (1995); see also, id. at 652–54 (citing
Skinner for use of a balancing test and both Skinner and VonRaab for examples of suspicionless searches that
comport with the Fourth Amendment).
120. Board of Education of Independent School Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Co. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822,
829–34 (2002); Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652–665 (1995).
121. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666 (1989); cf. New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 351–52 (1985) (Blackmun, J. concurring in the judgment) (coining the term and applying it more
broadly to include searches based on less than probable cause and a warrant such as stops and frisks).
122. Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995); see also, e.g., City of Los Angeles,
California v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015); Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 462–63 (2013); Missouri v.
McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 159 (2013).
123. See, e.g., Dressler & Michaels., supra note 15, at 227–232.
124. This dynamic is especially fraught when both civil and criminal sanctions attend a regulatory
violation. E.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 692 (1987).
125. See infra, Part IV.A.1.
126. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) (regarding defendant’s testimony on direct examination).
See also United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (extending the rule to defendant’s testimony on cross-
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In addition, prosecutors may use evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment in presenting a case to the grand jury.127 While it is certainly possible
to object to these holdings, the grand jury does not determine guilt or innocence,
and defendants can avoid impeachment by not taking the stand.
The following discussion addresses an arguably more extreme use of evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment: the introduction, in the
prosecutor’s case in chief, of evidence obtained in unreasonable warrantless
searches. This development is the result of the so-called “good faith” exception.
“Good faith” does not mean the “search” comported with Fourth Amendment
requirements; it means the trial court cannot exclude the unconstitutionally
obtained evidence. Thus, the “good faith” exception to exclusion results in
convictions based at least in part on evidence that has no Fourth Amendment
validity.
A. How the Warren Court Set the Stage for a “Good Faith” Exception
Federal courts have excluded evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment since 1886.128 In 1961, the Warren Court required state courts to do
so as well.129 Nevertheless, a number of Warren Court opinions contain rhetoric
that later Courts would combine to make it easier for prosecutors to introduce in
the case in chief evidence seized in direct violation of the Fourth Amendment.130
Two examples of such rhetoric seem particularly significant: the shift in
articulating the rationale supporting exclusion, and the increased use of the term
“good faith” in discussing official behavior.
1. Rationales Supporting Exclusion
The Supreme Court first excluded evidence as a reaction to Fourth
Amendment violations by courts, not police. The first instance occurred in Boyd v.
United States, decided in 1886. The Boyd Court’s use of the Fourth Amendment
looked very different from today’s practice. This was a forfeiture case,131 and the
“search and seizure” was the court’s order to produce an invoice, not a direct
physical intrusion.132 The Court found that the Fourth Amendment was
examination).
127. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
128. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
129. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
130. It is important to distinguish the situation where evidence is admitted because the court concludes that
violation of the Fourth Amendment did not cause seizure of the item at issue. Doctrines include “attenuation”
(e.g. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963);
“independent source” (e.g., Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988)); and “inevitable discovery” (e.g., Nix
v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 445–46 (1984)).
131. Id. at 634 (asserting that “forfeiture of a man’s property by reason of offenses committed by him,
though they may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal”).
132. Id. at 634. By statute, failure to produce the invoice would be treated as a confession of the
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inextricably linked with the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause, holding
that the court’s order to produce a document constituted an unreasonable “seizure”
and that the Fifth Amendment prohibited admission of the evidence.133
Almost thirty years later,134 in Weeks v. United States, the Court again
determined that exclusion of evidence was required for a trial court’s violation of
the Fourth Amendment. The defendant had moved for return of letters taken from
his house allegedly in violation of the Fourth Amendment.135 The lower court
denied the motion as to material intended to be used as evidence in the criminal
trial against Weeks. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed, holding that the lower
court’s refusal to turn over the papers involved “a denial of the constitutional rights
of the accused, . . .”136 The Court was clear that the Fourth Amendment violation
was on the part of the lower court, not just the federal officers who had seized the
letters:
The effect of the 4th Amendment is to put the courts of the United
States . . . in the exercise of their power and authority, under
limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and
authority, and to forever secure the people, their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against all unreasonable searches and seizures
under the guise of law. . . and the duty of giving [this protection]
force and effect is obligatory upon all intrusted [sic] under our
Federal system with the enforcement of the laws.137
The Weeks Court considered the issue be a court’s right to use evidence seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment in a criminal case.138 It believed that courts
would be complicit if allowed to do so:
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the
country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures . . .
should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts, which are
government’s criminal allegations. Id. at 620. “In order to apply the fourth amendment to the factual situation in
Boyd, Justice Bradley had to interpret ‘search and seizure’ as including the compulsory production of documents.”
The Life and Times of Boyd v. United States. 1886-1976, 76 MICH. L. REV. 184, 186–87 (1977).
133. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633–34.
134. An intermediate case, Adams v. New York, decided in 1904, applied an exclusionary rule based on
evidentiary principles. 192 U.S. 585 (1904). Accord, Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The
Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1365, 1374 (1983) (naming Adams as one of the three seminal cases leading to adoption of the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule but noting that Adams turned out to be “just a wild turn in the exclusionary rule roller coaster
track”).
135. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 388–89 (1914). The Court expressly limited the exclusionary
rule to evidence obtained by federal officers, as it did not consider the Fourth Amendment to apply to state
officers. Id. at 398.
136. Id., 232 U.S. at 398.
137. Id. at 391–92 (emphasis supplied).
138. Id. at 393.
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charged at all times with the support of the Constitution, and to
which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the
maintenance of such fundamental rights.139
The lower court should have returned the documents to Weeks.140 While the words
“deter” and “deterrence” do not appear in the opinion,141 the Weeks Court saw the
Fourth Amendment as restraining both federal officers and the federal courts142
and saw the exclusion of evidence as affecting law enforcement and the federal
courts equally.143
The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule as we know it grew out of these
cases.144 In the 1920s, the Court applied the rule to situations that presented issues
quite different from those in the prior cases, and so broadened the scope of the
rule’s application.145
The sense that courts were participants in Fourth Amendment violations
appeared next in a majority opinion in the 1943 case, McNabb v. United States.146
The Court excluded evidence based on its supervisory powers over federal trials,
not the Fourth Amendment147; the search had been conducted by state officers, and
139. Id. at 392 (emphasis supplied); see also, id. at 394 (“To sanction [the unlawful search and seizure]
proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect, if not an open defiance, of the prohibitions
of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people against such unauthorized action”).
140. Id. at 398.
141. See also, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 6, at 31 (noting that Weeks’ use of the exclusionary rule did not
rest on a deterrence rationale but on the “principled basis” of avoiding “‘sanctioning’ or ‘ratifying’ the police
lawlessness that produced the proffered evidence. . ..”).
142. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391–92 (“The effect of the 4th Amendment is to put the courts of the United States
and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and restraints as to the
exercise of such power and authority . . . .”) (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 394 (“To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect,
if not an open defiance, of the prohibitions of the Constitution . . . .”).
144. Accord, e.g., Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and
Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1372 (1983) (“[n]one of
the three Supreme Court cases credited with producing the rule focused on whether the exclusionary rule, as we
know it, should exist-yet somehow, in 1914, after all three cases had been decided, the rule was established”).
The third case was Adams v. New York, 192 U.D. 585 (1904), in which the exclusion argument was based on
evidentiary, not constitutional, principles. Stewart at 1374.
145. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391–92 (1920); Gouled v. U.S., 255 U.S.
298, 306–11 (1921), abrogated by Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Agnello v. U.S., 269 U.S. 20, 33–34
(1925); Stewart, supra note 135, at 1375–76 (discussing how Silverthorne Lumber and Gouled “significantly
broadened the narrow rule of exclusion of the Boyd and Weeks cases).
146. McNabb v. U.S., 318 U.S. 332 (1943). Strong articulations of this perspective also appeared in
dissents to the Court’s finding of no Fourth Amendment violation in Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 463–65
(1928). Justices Brandeis and Holms would have found a violation based on the federal officers’ committing a
criminal act under State law. Id. 469–70 (Justice Holmes); id. at 489–90 (Justice Brandeis). Justice Brandeis
based his conclusion in part on a sense that when prosecutor knowingly seeks to use evidence obtained by criminal
means, “the government itself would become a lawbreaker.” Id. at 483 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes
agreed: “[N]o distinction can be taken between the government as prosecutor and the government as judge. If the
existing code does not permit district attorneys to have a hand in such dirty business it does not permit the judge
to allow such iniquities to succeed.” Id. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
147. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 341–42.
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the Fourth Amendment did not yet apply to them.148 In excluding the evidence at
issue, however, the Court relied on the judicial integrity rationale, specifically
comparing courts that permitted such evidence to accessories after the fact.149
At first, the Warren Court also seemed to focus on judicial integrity. In Elkins
v. United States, the Court exercised its supervisory powers over federal courts to
require exclusion of evidence unconstitutionally obtained by state officers.150 The
Court discussed at length the need to promote “healthy federalism” and the
“imperative of judicial integrity.”“151 Regarding the latter point, the Court asserted
that federal courts should not “be accomplices in the willful disobedience of a
Constitution they are sworn to uphold.”152
The shift came a year after Elkins, in Mapp v. Ohio, when the Warren Court
for the first time imposed the exclusionary rule on the states—the forums for the
majority of criminal prosecutions.153 Perhaps because this was such a big step, or
because judicial integrity can also be implicated when exclusion prevents the
factfinder from having all the facts,154 the Court gave a number of reasons for doing
so. First it noted changes in “factual considerations” since Wolf.155 Next, it
discussed the importance of the Fourth Amendment itself: avoiding turning the
Amendment into a mere “form of words,” citing the ability to exclude evidence as
an essential part of the Fourth Amendment “right,” and expressing the desire to
treat the Fourth Amendment similarly as the other right-granting amendments.156
The Mapp Court also mentioned precedent but reviewed it quite selectively.
Notwithstanding the long history of cases emphasizing judicial integrity, the Mapp
Court’s review of exclusionary rule precedent emphasized deterrence. It implied
that the exclusion in Weeks was based on deterrence even though that case did not
mention the word or even focus on the concept; its focus was preventing the federal
148. The Court applied the Fourth Amendment to state officers in Mapp v. Ohio, 67 U.S. 643 (1961).
149. McNabb v. U.S., 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943) (“Plainly, a conviction resting on evidence secured through
such a flagrant disregard of the procedure which Congress has commanded cannot be allowed to stand without
making the courts themselves accomplices in wilful [sic] disobedience of law.”) (emphasis added).
150. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). Elkins eliminated the “silver platter doctrine,” which
had allowed federal criminal courts to use evidence seized by state and local officers in violation of the Fourth
Amendment as long as no federal officers were involved in the violation. Id. at 208. Use of the supervisory powers
was necessary, as the Court had earlier declined to require state courts to exclude evidence obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). In discussing exclusion, the Court mentioned
“deterrence” in passing, but did not specify whether it was police or courts that would be deterred. Id. at 31–32.
The dissent in Wolf also mentioned deterrence and focused on deterring police and prosecutors. Id. at 42–43
(Murphy, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 221–23.
152. Id. at 223. The Court asserted that the purpose of excluding evidence is to deter, but it did not specify
the target of the deterrence. Id. at 217.
153. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
154. See, e.g., John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1036 (1974).
155. Id. at 653. The Court mentioned changes in state rules (651–52), changes in rules developed by the
Supreme Court to eliminate the “silver platter” doctrine (Elkins), to formulate “a method to prevent state use of
evidence unconstitutionally seized by federal agents” (Rea v. United States., 350 U.S. 214 (1956) and to relax
requirements (Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (653)).
156. Id. at 655–56.
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system generally from benefitting from the unconstitutional behavior.157 The Mapp
Court mentioned McNabb without noting that case’s reliance on the judicial
integrity rationale.158 Finally, going further, the Mapp Court said that “the purpose
of the exclusionary rule ‘is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to
disregard it’,” quoting Elkins, but not mentioning that case’s equal reliance on
judicial integrity.159
The Mapp Court did mention judicial integrity, but in a way that relegated it
to secondary status, thus giving impetus to the Court’s retreat from what some
commentators have called the “majestic exclusionary rule.”160 The consideration
did not appear in the opinion until the Court was finished discussing precedent and
had begun discussing why extending the exclusionary rule to the states “makes
very good sense.”161 In this context, the Court mentioned the “‘imperative of
judicial integrity’”162 along with “avoidance of needless conflict between state and
federal courts”163 and the inability to assume “that, as a practical matter, adoption
of the exclusionary rule fetters law enforcement.”164 At the end of the opinion,
however, the Court seemed to give judicial integrity and police deterrence equal
billing: “Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more
than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no less than
that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial
integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice.”165
After Mapp, the Warren Court discussed the rationale for the exclusionary rule
in only three cases,166 and its justifications for the rule were inconsistent. One case
157. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648.
158. Id. at 649–50.
159. Id. at 656 (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217) (emphasis added).
160. Scott E. Sundby & Lucy B. Ricca, The Majestic and the Mundane: The Two Creation Stories of the
Exclusionary Rule, 398 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 391, 398 (2010).
161. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
162. Id. at 659 (again citing Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222).
163. Id. at 657–58 (citing Elkins, 364 U.S. at 221).
164. Id. (citing Elkins, 364 U.S. at 218).
165. Id. at 660.
166. In some other cases the Court found no “search” or “seizure,” so the Fourth Amendment did not apply.
Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lewis v. United
States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 440 (1963); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373
U.S. 647, 649 (1963); Lanza v. State of New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962). In other cases the Court found the
“search” or “seizure” to have been reasonable. Cooper v. State of California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967); Warden,
Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967); Ker v. State of California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
In some cases where the Court found Fourth Amendment violations, the posture of the case made it unnecessary
to discuss the exclusionary rule’s validity. See Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818, 819 (1969); Von Cleef v. New
Jersey, 395 U.S. 814, 816 (1969); Mancusi v. Deforte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968); Camara v. Mun. Court of City &
Cty. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Berger v. State of N.Y.,
388 U.S. 41, 44 (1967); Stanford v. State of Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 486 (1965); Aguilar v. State of Tex, 378 U.S.
108 (1964). In cases where exclusion was an issue, the Court merely applied the rule without discussing its
rationales. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 753 (1969); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40, 65 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364
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emphasized a deterrence rationale without mentioning judicial integrity.167
Another case emphasized deterrence and judicial integrity equally.168 The third
case emphasized deterrence of “lawless police conduct” as a justification for the
exclusionary rule (again mischaracterizing precedent) and mentioned the need to
avoid reducing the Fourth Amendment to a “mere ‘form of words’”169; however,
the Court also acknowledged judicial integrity as a “vital function,” hinting at the
“accessory after the fact” metaphor170 and ultimately saw the deterrence and
judicial integrity rationales as intertwined.171
2. Use of the Term “Good Faith” in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court’s first mention of “good faith” in a Fourth Amendment
case occurred in 1925. The term popped up in Carroll v. United States as part of
a discussion of whether officers had probable cause to stop the car they searched.172
The Court quoted from a 1923 civil suit for false imprisonment in which the
defendant had the burden to establish lack of probable cause for the arrest at issue:
“[G]ood faith is not enough to constitute probable cause. That faith must be
grounded on facts within knowledge of the Director General’s agent.”173
The term does not appear again in a Supreme Court Fourth Amendment
opinion until 1947. Harris v. United States involved the search of an entire
apartment incident to an arrest in the living room. The Supreme Court found the
search to be reasonable and mentioned in passing that the Circuit Court of Appeals
had affirmed the conviction, in part, because the agents had conducted the search
in good faith.174 As it found the search to be constitutional, the Court did not reach
any issue involving the exclusionary rule.
The Warren Court did not use the notion of “good faith” in discussing
application of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. It did, however, use the
term more frequently than previous Courts had done: while commenting on the
motives or intent of government agents in cases regarding a non-Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule175; commenting in passing on the rationale of a
(1964); Silverman v. U.S., 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
167. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636–37 (1965) (declining to give Mapp retroactive effect).
168. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485–86 (1963) (extending the exclusionary rule to
derivative evidence).
169. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968) (extending both the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary
rule to stops and frisks). Id. at 12.
170. Id. (“Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot and will not be made party to lawless invasions
of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions”).
171. Id. at 12–13.
172. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161–62 (1925).
173. Id. at 161 (quoting Director General v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25, 28 (1923)).
174. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 156, 154–55 (1947).
175. Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80, 81 (1968) (declining to order retroactive application a newly interpreted
statutory exclusionary rule, saying that doing so “would overturn every state conviction obtained in good-faith
reliance” on previous precedent); Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property at 104 East Tenth St., Kansas City, Mo.,
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lower court176; in noting that an officer’s good faith is not enough to establish
probable cause or reasonable suspicion177; and allowing a “good faith” defense to
a local judge sued for civil rights violations.178 The Warren Court’s use of the term
“good faith,” however, when combined with its elevation of the deterrence
rationale, set the stage for subsequent Courts to seriously undermine enforcement
of the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause.
B. Development of the “Good Faith” Exception
The Burger Court soon began exploring and developing a connection between
the “good faith” and deterrence” notions. It ultimately used the combination as a
basis for creating a “good faith” exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule. The journey to a “good faith” exception can be described in three discrete
components: (1) the elimination of judicial integrity as a reason to exclude
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) the combination of
the now-focal rationale of deterrence with the notion of an officer’s subjective
good faith; and (3) the downgrading of exclusion of evidence from a “rule” to a
“remedy.” For ease of writing, this discussion will use the term “unconstitutionally
obtained evidence” for evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The first component was the elimination of judicial integrity as a reason to
exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence. The Burger Court accomplished this
over the course of a number of decisions.179 In a 1974 opinion, the Burger Court
did not mention judicial integrity at all when it allowed use of unconstitutionally
obtained evidence in front of the grand jury.180 In 1975, the Court articulated
judicial integrity and deterrence as equally deserving of consideration when
declining to give retroactive effect to a substantive Fourth Amendment ruling.181

367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961) (regarding a due process challenge to State procedures authorizing searches and seizures
for obscene material); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 219, 226 (1960) (noting, in a case in which exclusion
of improperly seized evidence was still based on the Fifth Amendment, the scarcity of evidence in the record that
the behavior would be “serious misconduct” if true, but a “finding of bad faith is . . . not open to us on this record”
and pointing to the trial court’s conclusion that the actions were taken in “good faith”).
176. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 754 (1969) (assuming for purposes that officers had probable
cause to arrest, but noting that lower courts had relied on the officer’s good faith in procuring an arrest warrant
that turned out to be invalid).
177. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (“And simple “good faith on the part of the arresting officer is
not enough.’ * * * If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would
evaporate, and the people would be ‘secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,’ only in the discretion of
the police’”); Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964) (“We may assume that the officers acted in good faith
in arresting the petitioner. But ‘good faith on the part of the arresting officers is not enough’”); Henry v. United
States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959) (“Evidence required to establish guilt is not necessary. On the other hand, good
faith on the part of the arresting officers is not enough”).
178. Pierson v. J.L. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
179. Accord, Kamisar, supra note 6, at 31 (noting the shift to a deterrence rationale and interest balancing).
180. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). The Court’s opinion never mentioned judicial
integrity despite that consideration being raised by the dissent. Id. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
181. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975).
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Nevertheless, relying on a revisionist history that cited no cases earlier than Mapp,
the opinion asserted that “the Court has relied principally upon the deterrent
purpose served by the exclusionary rule”182 and rested its decision on the premise
that “the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police
conduct. . ..”183 That same year, declining to allow some prisoners to raise Fourth
Amendment issues in postconviction suits, the Court noted the Warren Court’s
mention of deterrence in Elkins and principal reliance on deterrence in Mapp.184 It
went on to assert that judicial integrity had played a “limited role” in post-Mapp
opinions185 and concluded that deterrence of police misconduct is the “primary
justification” for excluding evidence.186 In a 1976 holding declining to exclude
evidence in a civil tax proceeding, the Court focused on deterrence of police
officers as the reason to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.187 The Court did mention judicial integrity in a footnote, but treated
it as a variation of the deterrence rationale.188 Finally, in several cases, the Court
buttressed its downgrading of the judicial integrity rationale by commenting on the
negative effect exclusion of relevant evidence has on factfinding.189
The second component was the combination of the now-focal deterrence
rationale with the notion of an officer’s subjective good faith.190 The connection
for the Court was its conclusion that it was either impossible or extremely difficult
to deter officers who had a good faith belief in that their actions comported with
182. Id. at 536.
183. Id. at 542.
184. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484 (1975) (addressing the ability to raise Fourth Amendment issues
in post-conviction suits).
185. Id. at 485 (mentioning cases that did not address objections to use of evidence in the prosecution’s
case in chief made by a defendant with standing).
186. Id. at 486.
187. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976); see also, id. at 446 (asserting, with citations to
Calandra and Peltier, that “the Court . . . has established that the ‘prime purpose’ of the rule, if not the sole one,
‘is to deter future unlawful police conduct’”).
188. Id. at 458 n.35. The Court noted that “[t]he primary meaning of ‘judicial integrity’ in the context of
evidentiary rules is that the courts must not commit or encourage violations of the Constitution”; since the Fourth
Amendment violation occurs at the time of the search, the question is “whether the admission of the evidence
encourages violations of Fourth Amendment rights,” and this is the same as asking “whether exclusion would
serve a deterrent purpose.”
189. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626, 627 (1980) (regarding use of evidence seized in violation
of the Fourth Amendment to impeach the defendant’s testimony at trial); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727,
735 n.8 (1980) (regarding a defendant who the Court concluded lacked standing to challenge the search); Janis,
428 U.S. at 447,, 448–49; Peltier, 422 U.S. at 535–38 (finding it crucial that exclusion of “concededly relevant
evidence” is done to “enforce a constitutional guarantee that does not relate to the integrity of the factfinding
process”); Stone, 428 U.S. at 485 (concluding that he judicial integrity concern “has limited force as a justification
for the exclusion of highly probative evidence”); see also, Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971)
(rejecting retroactive application of a post-Mapp holding); cf. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 445 (1984) (making
same observation in context of a 6th Amendment right-to-counsel confession case).
190. As a precursor to this conclusion, the Court asserted that judicial integrity is not “offended” when
officers act in good faith. Peltier, 422 U.S. at 537–38. See also, Sundby & Ricca, supra note 161, at 424 (crediting
the combination of the deterrence rationale with themes hostile to viewing exclusion as a Fourth Amendment
right as contributing to curtailing exclusion of evidence).
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the Fourth Amendment.191
The third component was to view the exclusion of evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment as a mere remedy. As Sundby and Ricca have
explained, the Warren Court had continued the tradition of viewing exclusion of
evidence as a “rule” that was an integral part of the Fourth Amendment right.192
The “counter-narrative” that sees exclusion of evidence as a mere remedy also has
a long history.193 Despite the Warren Court’s adherence to the exclusionary “rule”
as inherent in the Fourth Amendment, “remedy” rhetoric crept into at least one
Warren Court opinion.194 The view of exclusion as a mere remedy did not
dominate, however, until the Burger Court,195 where it played an important role in
developing the “good faith” exception.
The Court’s combination of deterrence, good faith, and “mere remedy” finally
came to fruition in 1984 when United States v. Leon firmly established a “good
faith” exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule for cases where the
Fourth Amendment violation was made by the magistrate who had issued the
warrant.196 The Court found officers’ reliance on the warrant to be reasonable,197
and the opinion focused on deterrence as the justification for the exclusionary
rule.198 With that in mind, the Court balanced the costs and benefits of the
exclusionary rule and concluded that the balance usually favored adoption of a

191. Janis, 428 U.S. at 438 n.35 (noting that in addition to other considerations diminishing any deterrent
effect, “the officers here were clearly acting in good faith . . . a factor that the Court has recognized reduces
significantly the potential deterrent effect of exclusion”); accord, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 6, at 31 (noting that
the deterrence rationale bloomed in the post-Warren Court era); see, Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164
(1978) (declaring that the affiant’s good faith was an inherent premise of the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause
and holding that a hearing is required to determine existence of a false material statement in a search warrant
affidavit made in bad faith); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38 n.3 (1979) (asserting that “[n]o conceivable
purpose of deterrence would be served by suppressing evidence which, at the time it was found on the person of
the respondent, was the product of a lawful arrest and a lawful search. To deter police from enforcing a
presumptively valid statute was never remotely in the contemplation of even the most zealous advocate of the
exclusionary rule”); cf. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974) (asserting, in a pre-Miranda confession
case, that where police have acted in good faith, as opposed to engaging in willful or negligent violation of the
law, “the deterrence rationale loses much of its force”). But see United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 562
(1982) (rejecting government’s argument that 4th Amendment. decisions should not be applied retroactively to
all convictions not yet final at the time of the decision if officers acted in good faith).
192. Sundby & Ricca, supra note 161, at 411–14 (noting that the pre-Warren Court had referred to
exclusion as a “remedy” in Wolf v. Colorado, but the Warren Court restored the “rule” language in Mapp); see
also, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 6, at 31 (noting the Burger Court’s “‘deconstitutionalizing’” the exclusionary rule).
193. Id. at 414–23.
194. Id. at 423–24 (reviewing Justice Stewart’s opinion in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960)).
195. Id. at 424–33 (reviewing the opinions in United States v. Calandra and Stone v. Powell).
196. U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920–21 (1984). See also, Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984)
(applying Leon and discussing why the officer’s reliance was reasonable); Kamisar, supra note 6, at 33 (calling
the “good faith” exception a “reasonable mistake” doctrine).
197. Leon, 468 U.S. at 926.
198. Id. at 906 (repeating the language from Calandra regarding the rule being “a judicially created remedy
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect” and asserting that
deterrence can be accomplished without automatic exclusion in all cases); see also id. at 918 et seq. (focusing
entirely on deterrence).
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“good faith” exception when officers acted on the basis of a facially valid
warrant.199 The Court considered deterrence to apply only to law enforcement
officers, not to courts.200 In fact, the Court’s only mention of judicial integrity was
to downgrade that consideration in the face of the dissenting opinions’ urging that
the concern should remain an important consideration.201 The Court did not discuss
at all the origin of exclusion of evidence to address Fourth Amendment violations
by courts.202
After Leon the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts applied the “good faith”
exception when officers, relying on officially provided misinformation, acted on
what they reasonably thought was probable cause203; when officers relied on a
statute, later found unconstitutional, that authorized warrantless administrative
searches204; and when officers relied on “binding judicial precedent.”205
C. The “Good Faith” Exception and the Allowance of Unreasonable Warrantless
Searches
Once upon a time, searches compatible with the Warrant Clause were the
standard (or at least the preference) and searches validated by Reasonableness
Clause doctrines were “exceptions to the warrant requirement.”
Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the
(Fourth) Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes,’
and that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically
and well-delineated exceptions.206

199. Id. at 907–924.
200. Id. at 916.
201. Id. at 921 & n.22. Among other points, Justice Brennan’s dissent objected to making deterrence the
sole purpose of the exclusionary rule, asserting that this view “relegates the judiciary to the periphery” and
reminding that the fourth amendment restrains the government as a whole. Id. at 932 (Brennan, J., dissenting,
joined by Marshall). Brennan also noted that deterrence was not a relevant concern in the early exclusionary rule
decisions. Id. at 938. Justice Stevens’ dissent did focus on deterrence, asserting that the Court’s holding
diminishes its effect. Id. at 974–75 (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, Stevens also asserted that the holding
“tarnishes the role of the judiciary” and the original rationale for exclusion (judicial integrity) “retains its force as
well as its relevance.” Id. at 921 n.2.
202. See supra notes 130–49.
203. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 145–46 (2009) (involving misinformation provided by clerks
in police departments other than that of the arresting officer); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 4 (1995) (involving
misinformation provided by court clerks).
204. Ill v Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 355 (1987) (asserting that an officer cannot “be said to have acted in goodfaith reliance upon a statute if its provisions are such that a reasonable officer should have known that the statute
was unconstitutional”).
205. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 249–50 (2011) (discussing reliance on a Supreme Court doctrine
that was later modified).
206. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (citations omitted).
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The list of “reasonable” warrantless searches has grown since the Warren Court,
but the Court has continued to repeat this mantra207 and to state that the Warrant
Clause is “the bulwark of Fourth Amendment protection.”208
Thus, it is striking that in cases where the “good faith” exception applies there
is neither a valid warrant nor an applicable Reasonableness Clause doctrine. In
United States v. Leon, there was no Fourth Amendment warrant because the
document purporting to be a warrant lacked probable cause.209 In the two “good
faith” cases decided by the post-Burger Court there was no warrant at all at the
time of the search because the warrant had been withdrawn or quashed.210 In these
cases lacking a valid warrant, no Reasonableness Clause doctrine surfaced to
validate seizure of the evidence. Similarly, two “good faith” cases that involved
admittedly warrantless searches also lacked a supporting Reasonableness Clause
doctrine.211
The Fourth Amendment was violated in all of these cases, but so what? The
Court now considers exclusion of evidence to be a mere “remedy” instead of an
integral part of the Fourth Amendment right.212 Treating exclusion as a remedy
may be justifiable if there is another remedy to make the right operational. In 1961,
the Warren Court did, in fact, authorize such a remedy against state and local
officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,213 and in 1971 the Burger Court created a similar
remedy against federal officials, modeled on § 1983.214 It is arguable that these
remedies are illusory given the barriers the Court has placed on successful use of
these causes of action.215
So far, the “good faith” exception applies only when a Fourth Amendment
207. E.g., Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2543 (2019); Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
2206, 2221 (2018); City of Ontario, Calif., v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010); Horton v. California, 496 U.S.
128, 133 & n.4 (1990); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S.
307, 312 (1978); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 470–
71 (1971).
208. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164 (1978). Consistent with its move toward a “good faith”
exception, however, the Court continued to note that the Warrant Clause “takes the affiant’s good faith as its
premise.” Id.
209. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 903–05 (1984).
210. Herring v United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137–38 (2009); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1995).
211. In Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987), the officer relied on a statute later found unconstitutional. In
Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011), the officer relied on a Reasonableness Clause doctrine contained in
binding precedent that was later overturned.
212. Supra notes 191–94.
213. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
214. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
215. See., e.g., Harrington, James C., Overcoming Section 1983 Hurdles: Using the Americans with
Disabilities Act to Re-open the Civil Rights Door and Hold Government and Police Accountable, Georgetown
University Law Center Continuing Legal Education 25th Annual Section 1983: Civil Rights Litigation (2007),
2007 WL 5269445 at *1, n.1 and at *2-3; cf. Kamisar, supra note 6, at 33 (noting “[t]he ‘substantial’ costs said
to be exacted by the exclusionary rule would also be exacted by any other means of enforcing the Fourth
Amendment that worked”) (emphasis in original); id. at 39 (noting that a meaningful tort remedy also puts
pressure on courts to water down search-and-seizure rules).
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violation was on the part of actors other than law enforcement officers themselves,
and there may even be limits to the exception where it does apply.216 Nevertheless,
use of the exception means that prosecutors may freely use evidence seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment making their case against those accused of
crimes.
As the Supreme Court said in Marbury v. Madison, “[i]t is a settled and
invariable principle, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and
every injury its proper redress.”217 As the Warren Court observed in Terry v. Ohio,
[I]n our system evidentiary rulings provide the context in which
the judicial process of inclusion and exclusion approves some
conduct as comporting with constitutional guarantees and
disapproves other actions . . . . A ruling admitting evidence in a
criminal trial, we recognize, has the necessary effect of
legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence, while an
application of the exclusionary rule withholds the constitutional
imprimatur.218
The current Court’s use of the “good faith” exception is tantamount to authorizing
a category of searches that may be conducted in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
By employing rhetoric that is easily manipulatable, the Warren Court planted
the seeds that later Courts would use to frustrate an expansive interpretation of
Fourth Amendment protections. This article has traced ways that counterrevolution occurred in three basic areas of Fourth Amendment law: determining
whether government activity is covered by the Amendment at all, determining
whether a warrantless search was “reasonable,” and determining whether evidence
seized through an unreasonable, warrantless search is nevertheless admissible in
the prosecution’s case in chief.219 Although the current Court may be reversing the
trend in some areas—especially those involving intrusive technology—the
promise of a Warren Court expansion of Fourth Amendment rights has often been
defeated by use of the tools that Court itself provided.

216. But see, Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 146 (2009) (suggesting that recklessness in
maintaining a warrant system or systemic errors might eliminate a “good faith” exception).
217. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 147 (1803); see also, id. at 163 (noting that affording a remedy for
injury is the “very essence of civil liberty” and citing Blackstone).
218. Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1968).
219. As Professor Kamisar noted, “[t]here are two principal ways to reduce the impact of Mapp v. Ohio:
(a) by narrowing the thrust of the exclusionary rule . . . and (b) by shrinking the scope of the amendment itself. . .
.” Kamisar, supra note 6, at 30. As this article has traced, the Court has used Warren Court rhetoric to do both.
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